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ABSTRACT
Congestion pricing imposes a usage fee on a public resource during times of high demand.
Road pricing involves cordoning off a section of the city and imposing a fee on vehicles
that enter it. Parking pricing increases the costs of on-street and perhaps off-street parking.
Following an historical review, we develop a new queueing model of the parking pricing
problem, recognizing that many urban drivers are simply looking for available on-street
parking. Often, reducing the number of such “cruising drivers” would reduce urban road
congestion dramatically, perhaps as effectively as cordoning off the center city.
*Corresponding Author.  Contacting information: Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Room E40-231b, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139.
E-mail: rclarson@mit.edu.  Phone: 617 253 3604; Fax: 617 258 7733.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful for helpful discussions and valuable information from Amedeo R. Odoni,
Fred Salvucci, Akira Hibiki, and Robert Irwin. We also thank Cordell Hull for awarding a
research grant to MIT to help support this research. In addition, we thank the MIT-Portugal
Program, which supported this research, as well. Finally, we thank Judith Stitt for her
professional excellence in helping to edit this paper.
21. Introduction
Consider a typical recent study of street traffic congestion in urban America. This particular
report1 is from the Park Slope section of Brooklyn, New York, a thriving commercial and
residential zone. The purpose of the study was “…to ascertain the extent of the
neighborhood’s ever-worsening traffic and parking problems and to propose solutions to
both.” Based on data collected early in 2007, “…the study reveals an overwhelming
amount of traffic is simply circling the block “cruising” for parking, while the curbside
itself is nearly 100% filled with parked vehicles.” The researchers found that 45% of total
traffic and 64% of local traffic is cruising for a parking space. And the average curb
occupancy rate is 94%, with “…nearly 100% occupancy at metered spaces during peak
periods.”
Street congestion in a growing city is unavoidable. Incentives to use cars for ease, comfort,
and other pleasures increase as cars become more affordable, even when an extensive
public transportation system is available. As a result, people drive more frequently than
necessary, leading to overuse of limited road resources. In rural areas, sufficient road
networks can be provided to prevent road congestion because land is abundant and demand
is less. For large cities, however, supplying new roads is more difficult because of the huge
demand for land resources. As a result, major city streets become crowded and inconvenient
despite the availability of public transportation, resulting in economic losses to the
community.
Urban congestion is a challenge within a complex system that requires the simultaneous
consideration of many options. In most cases, the solution chosen combines several
initiatives such as the congestion pricing (CP) schemes described in this paper and other
incentives to motivate people’s serious consideration of substituting public transportation,
bicycles, or walking for personal motorized vehicles. The particular combination of options
chosen depends on a number of factors, notably the city of concern and those areas most
3affected within it.
Road Pricing (RP), one economic measure used in traffic management, has attracted the
attention of many mayors of heavily congested cities, especially since the successful
implementation of RP schemes in Singapore and London. However, current RP schemes
present two serious challenges:
(1) Schemes billed as “RP” that are now planned or implemented in many cities are not
actually road pricing, but rather cordon pricing (which approximates area pricing), and
thus less effective than a full-scale electronic RP scheme: Theoretically, a congestion
charge (CC) should apply to every road within a charged zone in a full-scale RP scheme
rather than to only those roads crossing cordon lines, as currently is often the case.
Otherwise, RP is ineffective, particularly when drivers make many trips wholly within
the inner city.
(2) Any type of RP is costly because a new technology infrastructure (e.g., electronic
gantries along cordon lines) need to be installed to detect traffic flow, and a
management organization must be established to oversee toll collection. Application of
RP has therefore been limited, and has been implemented effectively only in the
downtown areas of large cities.
To address these issues, we consider parking pricing (PP), which can improve traffic
control by (1) increasing the average parking price in an area, effectively imposing a
congestion charge on parkers, and (2) raising on-street parking prices to improve traffic
flow. Since on-street parking prices influence drivers’ decisions about how much time to
spend searching for available street parking spaces, these prices are especially important in
congested city centers and commercial districts (such as Brooklyn’s Park Slope), where
many drivers look for spaces. Parking pricing offers the following practical benefits: (1) PP
does not necessarily require an additional toll-collection organization, making it cost-
4effective for medium- and small-scale cities for which RP is not affordable, and (2) PP can
be extended as its affected area expands without costly additional infrastructure or the risk
of increasing the number of exempted residents, which could significantly reduce the
effectiveness of RP. Thus, PP is not only flexible and effective, but again can be applied
even in medium- and small-scale cities that are grappling with disconnected or unevenly
congested areas.
Good examples of the efficacy of parking pricing can be found in Japan,2 where at one time
only police enforced parking regulations. Although on-street parking officially has not been
allowed on most roads in Japan, until recently people parked almost anywhere because the
number of police was insufficient to check for violators, and officers permitted a grace
period of 15 minutes or more before issuing tickets. Since June 1, 2006, however, Japan has
enforced a strict parking regulation in Tokyo, Osaka, and other cities that has proved
equivalent to eliminating much “free” street parking. In particular, a June 1 revision of the
Road Traffic Law has enabled private vendors to enforce parking regulations by issuing
tickets immediately after identifying violators, without any grace period. With no grace
period and such improved enforcement, the 15 minutes or more of “free” parking that had
been granted drivers on most roads as a grace period (or otherwise overlooked) has risen to
an expensive on-street parking which costs 10,000 yen (US$86) (as a penalty fee) for
parkers. This implementation has effectively increased the on-street parking prices for
drivers and as a result, increased the average parking prices in major cities in Japan at the
same time. Three months after the June 1, 2006, implementation, the National Police
Agency reported a 27.2% decrease in the average length of traffic jams and a 9.5% decrease
in average travel time on the main streets of Tokyo, comparable to results achieved with
London’s RP scheme. In addition, a modal shift from cars to public transportation was
observed. In fact, such improvements were observed in not only Tokyo but also medium-
sized cities throughout Japan where strict parking regulations were enforced. Tokyo’s
example thus demonstrates that PP can be as effective as RP, and a cost-effective alternative
for cities of all sizes.
52. Traffic Congestion
2.1 Cost of Congestion3, 4
As countries develop and the number of cars traversing them increases, the cost of
congestion greatly impedes their cities’ development. It has often been observed that
congestion increases as cities grow: In the United States, for example, the Texas
Transportation Institute (TTI) estimated5 the annual delay per peak-period traveler in very
large urban areas with populations of more than 3 million to be 61 h for the year 2003,
which is much larger than 13 h in small metropolitan areas with populations less than 0.5
million. The average annual delay for all cities has grown from 16 h to 47 h since 1982.
According to TTI’s estimate, congestion costs Americans $63.1 billion a year, based on
considerations of only time and fuel wasted. The total cost of congestion should be
considered in at least the following four categories, however:
(1) Waste of time: Congestion deprives businesses and individuals of work hours by
increasing commuting time. According to TTI, total delays reached 3.7 billion hours in
2003, a significant part of the total loss attributed to congestion. The simplest estimation
multiplies hours lost on congested roads by wage/hour. TTI used US$12.85/h for the
cost of time wasted in congestion,6 close to the average hourly wage in the US ($11.48)
for all goods-producing workers. However, this approach may overestimate the cost of
delay because delay cannot be completely eliminated from business activity. Another
method of estimation calculates net gains from reducing congestion. The former
estimation provides an upper bound for losses due to congestion; the latter method
yields a lower bound.
(2) Waste of resources and associated costs: Congestion wastes gasoline and damages
6pavement. According to TTI, engines idling in congested traffic wasted 2.3 billion
gallons of fuel in 2003. Gasoline wastage also contributes to the urgency of U.S.
strategic interests in the Middle East oil supply, which is much costlier in many ways
than the simple loss of material resources.
(3) Loss of environmental quality and associated costs: Congestion produces more air
pollution and noise than does smoothly flowing traffic, degrading the environmental
quality of roadside areas and consequently negatively impacting people’s health.
Congestion also produces excessive carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions that contribute to
global warming. The reduction in CO2 emissions from improved traffic flow can range
from several hundreds to thousands of tons, depending on city size. The cost associated
with emission credits7 is small, however, compared to the losses that can be considered
in terms of time and fuel.
(4) Loss of business: This loss to congestion is hard to estimate because congestion is a by-
product of business activity. Although many agree that excessive congestion leads to
inefficiencies and reduces a city’s attractiveness, many also believe that suppressing the
inflow of people might harm a city more than doing nothing since it may reduce the
number of people in the city and decrease business activity. This is often the case when
insufficient public transportation is offered to those who stop driving into the city after
RP is implemented. In fact, business leaders have raised the most opposition to RP in
London and New York.
2.2 Reasons for Congestion and Measures to Reduce It
(1) Demand-side problem: One obvious reason for congestion is people’s persistent
demand for private automotive transportation, which can be reduced by means of either
fuel tax or congestion pricing (CP) schemes—demand-side efforts. Fuel tax is not as
effective as congestion pricing in this regard because it reduces car usage uniformly
rather than coping with local and time-specific forms of congestion. Congestion pricing,
7however, can be applied effectively to specific areas and also made time-dependent if
the extra fee, or “congestion charge” (CC), is adjusted locally and dynamically in
accord with real-time traffic situations. According to some economic theories, the CC
level is set equal to the marginal external cost, as discussed in the second half of this
paper.
Congestion pricing can be implemented via RP by imposing fees on drivers crossing
cordoned lines, and/or via PP by imposing fees on drivers who park within the cordoned
area. Introducing truly local, dynamic CC is costly and technically difficult, though,
especially for RP: Currently available cordon-line-type RP cannot control trips taken
within cordoned areas effectively since road users are charged only once per day and
residents in cordoned areas are often exempted from paying full CC. Full-scale
electronic RP,8 which essentially prices every road in a city, requires advanced
technologies or numerous gantries in cordoned areas, making RP less cost-effective for
medium-scale cities than for larger cities. For the usual RP scheme, drivers are charged
fixed or pre-determined CCs, but its effectiveness is compromised. In contrast, PP can
effectively reduce trips taken within a cordoned area since the numbers of trips are
related to parking behaviors. Since parking lots are distributed throughout cities, PP is
locally and dynamically applied much more easily than is RP. PP can be applied to
disconnected, congested areas where cordon lines are hard to draw, and can be adapted
smoothly as congested areas expand.
(2) Supply-side problem: Excessive demand is not the only reason for congestion.
Insufficient parking capacity and inappropriate parking pricing are other reasons,
requiring supply-side efforts to counteract. Two observations9 in New York City have
especially interested us: (1) a recent survey conducted by Bruce Schaller, principal of
Schaller Consulting, showed that 28% of drivers in the SoHo district in Manhattan were
searching for on-street parking, and (2) as cited in this paper’s Introduction, a second
survey, by Transportation Alternatives, showed 45% of drivers were searching for on-
8street parking in the Park Slope neighborhood in Brooklyn.10 This, of course, is not
always the case, but often is during busy times in city centers, where most drivers try to
find a place to park. Historical data on the percentage of traffic cruising in selected
cities are displayed in Table 1 below. While these data are somewhat dated, we might
well find that the same cruising behavior observed downtown today has been in
evidence since the 1920s.
Table 1.
Percentage of traffic observed to be “cruising” for parking in selected cities.
Year City Share of traffic cruising
1927 Detroit (1) a 19%
1927 Detroit (2) 34%
1960 New Haven 17%
1977 Freiburg 74%
1985 Cambridge 30%
1993 New York 8%
Average 30%
aThe numbers refer to different locations within the same city.
Source: Shoup (2005); selected data.
The underlying problem is inappropriate PP when on-street parking capacity cannot
accommodate all who hope to park. In Manhattan, off-street parking (averaging US$24.42
per person per day) costs 14 times more than on-street parking (which averages US$1.73
per person per day).11 If prices for on-street parking are much lower than those charged by
off-street parking lots, drivers have strong incentive to search for parking on the street,
creating extra traffic and congestion. Well-planned PP dramatically improves traffic flow in
cities and decreases congestion without imposing CC on all drivers. We show the effect of
9PP on congestion in Section 4 of this paper.
3. Implementation
3.1 Examples of RP and PP Successes Around the World
3.1.1 London, England12 (RP)
Congestion charges went into effect in London on February 17, 2003, at an initial charge of
5 UK pounds (approximately US$10) per vehicle per day. Drivers paid the charge if their
vehicles entered a congestion-charging zone anytime between 7 a.m. and 6:30 p.m.
weekdays. Six hundred eighty-eight cameras in 203 locations within an 8-square-mile (21-
square-km) area captured the license plate numbers of about 250,000 vehicles daily. The
number of vehicles entering central London during charging hours declined about 25% the
day congestion charges were introduced. Since the time the RP scheme first went into
effect, vehicle delays due to traffic congestion have dropped about 30% and carbon dioxide
emissions have decreased more than 15%. In 2005-06, London’s RP scheme cost 230
million UK pounds (about US$460 million) to implement, while its annual operating costs
were around 88 million UK pounds (about US$176 million), its net revenue was 122
million UK pounds (about US$244 million),13 most of which was spent improving bus
services (London put 300 additional buses into service before introducing the congestion
charges). Bus passengers entering the charging zone during morning rush hour the first year
increased 37%.14
Because of such successes as well as a need to reduce traffic further, the City of London
raised its congestion charge to 8 pounds (US$16) per vehicle per business day in July 2005.
Since February 2007, the congestion-charging zone has extended west. Residents in the
zone can apply for a 90% discount price of 4 pounds (US$8) per business week.
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The success of London’s RP is usually explained as follows: First, the center city had been
heavily congested, and the citizens and mayor recognized the RP scheme should be
implemented. Second, the technology for gantries to automatically read license plates was
provided by the city, so citizens would not need to bear any related monetary burden such
as for the in-vehicle units (IVUs) that are required in Singapore’s case. Third, even before
implementation of RP in London, 85% of commuters used public transportation: more than
1 million riders per day. Hence, the additional expenses required to reinforce the public
transportation system in preparation for RP were minimal, and most of the commuting
public favored RP, expecting that it would improve public transportation.
3.1.2 Singapore15 (RP)
Congestion pricing was first adopted by the city of Singapore in 1975, using a paper license
scheme for want of a more reliable technology; the planners understood the scheme’s
limited effectiveness. Every vehicle containing three or fewer people was charged
Singapore$3 (about US$2) per business day on any given weekday upon initial entry to the
2.3-square-mile central area of the city between 7:30 a.m. and 10:15 a.m. This scheme
reduced the total peak-period traffic each business day by 45%. An electronic toll collection
system (Electronic RP, or ERP) using IVUs replaced paper licenses in April 1998 to better
control traffic. IVUs simplified the task of varying tolls by time of day or location.
Singapore initially did not change toll levels, hours, or boundaries to minimize controversy
over the charges, but gradually did start to vary tolls according to time and place; signs on
gantries now inform motorists of the toll in effect. Currently Singapore’s RP scheme is
closer than any other city’s to the ideal dynamic RP since the CC level changes with time
and location, using an ERP system.
3.1.3 Stockholm, Sweden16 (RP)
An RP scheme was applied in Stockholm on January 3, 2006. The system was scheduled to
run for seven months, then a vote on whether to continue was held on September 17, 2006.
In that referendum, the citizens of Stockholm voted for a congestion-charging scheme:
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51.7% in favor, 45.6% against.17 All parties in the city council promised to abide by the
results. A fee of 10 to 60 kronor (approximately US$1.4 to US$8.5) was charged vehicles
entering the inner city on weekdays between 6:30 a.m. and 6:30 p.m., payable by direct
debit. Traffic volumes were reduced 25%, and the number of vehicles during peak hours
fell by 100,000. At the same time, public transit rides increased by 40,000 per day. Retail
sales in central Stockholm shops also rose after the congestion-pricing scheme was
introduced, as people bought more locally rather than drive to suburban stores. The system
used cameras, but drivers were also encouraged to install radio-frequency identification
(RFID) transponders in their cars. . The permanent RP phase just started in Stockholm on
August 1, 2007, employing the same system used during the 7-month trial RP in 2006.
According to Prud’homme and Kopp,18 however, the Stockholm urban toll (UT) scheme
does not satisfy conditions for a successful RP scheme because (1) road congestion in
Stockholm is not very severe; (2) the implementation cost of RP is too high; and (3) the
marginal costs for public transportation improvements are high.
3.1.4 Trondheim, Norway (RP)
In the late 1980s an RP scheme was applied in Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim in Norway.
Trondheim has used the RP scheme for nearly 20 years, since 1988. Its objectives are to not
only fund new ring roads, but also improve the public transportation system and pedestrian
ways, and invest in environmental measures. Currently the toll price is 7.5 to 25 Norwegian
Kroner (about US$1 to US$4)—much less than the 8 UK pounds (about US$16) charged in
London. Since pricing varies 24 hours each day from highs during peak hours to lows
during off-peak hours, this scheme controls traffic flow to prevent congestion.19
3.1.5 Tokyo, Japan (PP)
The city of Tokyo has been investigating RP schemes since 1999, when the current
governor of the Tokyo District, Shintaro Ishihara, was first elected. One challenge has been
that Tokyo is so large and congested everywhere. Many roads are congested not because of
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a large inflow from the suburbs but because of numerous intracity trips: according to one
estimate made by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, about 40% of total trips in Tokyo
are intracity trips.20 Therefore, RP would not be effective if cordon-tolls similar to
London’s RP were implemented. PP would be more appropriate in Tokyo than a simple
cordon-line RP because PP can vary charges as needed to regulate intracity trips.
The effectiveness of PP in major Japanese cities can be illustrated by the following
example. Since June 1, 2006, parking violations have been regulated in such a way as to
drastically reduce congestion in major cities in Japan. Earlier, parking regulations had been
enforced only by police, who periodically would check to see how long cars had been
parked in banned areas, marking cars’ positions with chalk and ticketing them if parked
longer than 15–30 minutes. Since June 1, private firms have been consigned to issue tickets
for parking violations regardless of the number of minutes vehicles have been parked in
banned locations. Ticket fines range from 10,000 yen to 18,000 yen (US$86–155) for
regular cars, depending on the violation.
According to the National Police Agency,21 results of the first three months of strict parking
policy showed that illegal parking at main roads in Tokyo and Osaka had been reduced by
73.9% and 73.3%, respectively, congestion length on their main roads at 2p.m.-4p.m. had
been shortened by 27.3% and 23.1%, respectively, and travel speed at 2p.m.-4p.m. had
increased by 9.5% and 11.8%, respectively, compared to the same period the previous year.
The agency estimated economic benefits of this policy to be 181 billion yen (US$1.6
billion) and the reduction in CO2 emissions to be 15.2 thousand tons/yr. Retail shops with
parking lots have also attracted more people since implementation, while popular
restaurants without parking lots are said to have experienced a decrease in customers.
Increases in the average prices of off-street parking lots are also observed, due to
heightened demand for off-street parking. Also, more people have been using taxis and
buses to reach restaurants since the strict parking policy was implemented.
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3.1.6 Los Angeles, USA (PP)
Shoup examined eight case studies conducted from 1993 through 1995 on the effect of a
“cash-out” scheme in the Los Angeles region22. A cash-out scheme is one form of PP that
gives employees a choice between free parking and its cash equivalent, introducing the
market mechanism to companies’ free parking. This scheme does not remove a benefit
from employees since they can either continue driving to work or receive a cash benefit by
using public transportation. The results in Los Angeles were remarkable: after a cash-out
scheme was introduced, the number of solo drivers fell 17% while the number of carpoolers
rose 64%, and public transit ridership increased 50%. The number of miles traveled by
private vehicles declined 12%. This program has reduced the number of cars used to
commute without sacrificing the number of persons commuting, and, according to surveys
taken, has increased both employers’ and employees’ satisfaction.
3.2 Examples of RP and PP Under Review or Rejected
Some cities have experienced difficulties introducing an RP scheme, or at least have
required much time to consider doing so.
3.2.1 Edinburgh, Scotland (RP)
In February 2005, about 290,000 voters in and around the city of Edinburgh were asked
whether the city should implement an RP scheme similar to London’s. The plan proposed
was to charge 2 UK pounds (US$4) to enter the cordoned area and 60 UK pounds
(US$120) for violations—amounts much lower than those in London’s scheme. More than
74% of those queried rejected the scheme.23 Typical reasons Edinburgh citizens gave for
rejecting it follow:24
(1) Distrust of local government: Citizens regarded the RP scheme as a mere tool for
raising revenue rather than reducing congestion. Many thought alternative ways to
reduce congestion should be sought before additionally burdening citizens.
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(2) Currently inadequate public transportation: Edinburgh has a poor public transport
system. Citizens described it as expensive, dirty, and unreliable: an inadequate transport
framework in which to implement the RP scheme.
(3) Two cordons: Because the Edinburgh proposal recommended two cordoned areas, the
number of people impacted was greater than would have been the case with a simpler
one-cordon plan. Even though computer simulation showed the increased congestion at
two cordon lines would be minimal, people distrusted the results, worrying especially
about traffic increases in residential areas and around schools between the two cordon
lines.25
3.2.2 Hong Kong26 (RP)
Road pricing was first attempted in Hong Kong in the 1980s, using an electronic charge to
control traffic. In 1983, an experiment involved 2500 vehicles for five days. Full-scale
implementation was planned in 1985, but failed for two main reasons. First, people feared
being identified because the Chinese government might utilize RP as a tracking tool.27
Second, the electronic charging system was underdeveloped.
3.2.3 New York City, USA28 (RP)
New York City has been considering RP schemes for many years, but none have been fully
implemented. However, a recent news article indicated29 that Mayor Michael R.
Bloomberg’s RP plan received strong support from Governor Eliot Spitzer and the Bush
administration. The mayor’s plan would charge US$8 for cars and US$21 for commercial
trucks entering Manhattan below 86th street between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. on weekdays, or
US$4 for all drivers within the congestion zone. However, the following concerns remain:
(1) New York might be hurt economically.30 A report by the Queens Chamber of
Commerce31 released in February 2006 estimated that a US$14 congestion charge
similar to London’s would reduce by 40,000 the number of people entering
15
Manhattan’s central business district each weekday, causing a loss of US$2.7 billion
in economic output per year.
(2) There could be equity issues. Low-income drivers often lack flexibility to change a
given traffic pattern because they generally have fixed work schedules and
consequently difficult-to-change travel patterns. If they must drive to their required
destinations, they may have no option other than to pay any CC that is imposed.
However, a survey conducted32 in 2003 by Schaller Consulting for Transportation
Alternatives and the NYPIRG Straphangers Campaign showed that most people
who drive into Manhattan are wealthy. Specifically, Schaller Consulting conducted
a survey regarding the East River bridges connecting Manhattan with other parts of
the city. The East River bridges are inexpensive or even free, and therefore heavily
congested. In order to estimate the effect of charging fees to drivers crossing the
bridges, Schaller Consulting investigated the equity issue and found that lower-
income people are far more likely to take transit than to drive themselves across the
bridges. Since drivers crossing the bridges tend to be in the upper income ranges
anyway, therefore, Schaller concluded that a toll would have little impact on lower-
income drivers.33
3.2.4 Boston, USA34 (PP)
In 1975, Boston capped the number of off-street parking spaces available downtown at
35,500 spaces, in part to reduce people’s incentive to drive downtown. As a result, Boston’s
off-street parking price (averaging US$11 for the first hour) is now one of the nation’s
highest, next to New York City’s and Chicago’s. However, since the price gap between on-
street and off-street parking is wide, the incentive for drivers to find inexpensive street
parking is high—creating extra traffic. The average savings realized by finding on-street
parking in Boston is an estimated US$10/hour, again among the nation’s highest, next to
New York City and Chicago. Although no data exist concerning what percentage of total
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traffic is actually searching for street parking, the current pricing policy certainly does
affect traffic conditions negatively on most congested Boston streets.
3.3 Issues of RP and PP
Having reviewed several examples of RP and PP, we now can analyze the main issues
pertaining to these two sorts of pricing schemes as functional issues and other issues such
as stakeholder issues and equity issues. Functional issues can be addressed relatively
simply because they derive from RP and PP design.
Table 2.
Comparison of RP and PP
Type Road Pricing
(cordoned-area RP)
Road Pricing
(ful-scale RP)
Parking Pricing
Scheme
used
Congestion Charge Congestion Charge Congestion Charge,
Price differential
Fee
structure
Flat rate over charged
area, Per day fee
Locally adjusted fee,
Per trip fee
Locally adjusted fee,
Per trip fee
Excluded
(Exempted)
groups
Residents in charged
area, Public
transportation
Public transportation Through traffic,
Public Transportation
Both RP and PP can be implemented efficiently if no groups are excluded (exempted) and
congestion is uniform over the charged area. However, as the target area expands, the
number of residents within it increases and congestion within the area becomes less
uniform. In such a case, cordoned-area RP becomes less effective and full-scale RP
17
becomes more appropriate although associated administrative costs are huge. PP does not
have these issues: residents are not exempted, and parking fees can be applied locally (i.e.,
varied by locale). The biggest problem with PP is when through traffic is responsible for
most of the congestion, since PP cannot impose a congestion charge (CC) on each driver if
he does not park. In reality, though, most large cities are serviced by an extensive network
of highways. Therefore, in most cases, drivers with remote destinations never even enter
local congested roads.35 (Our presentation of a PP model in the following section does not
even consider through traffic.)
Stakeholder issues often create political hurdles for implementing RP/PP schemes, and
conflicts of interest affect the choice of schemes. We summarize the primary stakeholders
and their respective roles below:
(1) Government: Federal and local governments might be less interested in PP schemes
since these do not generate much extra revenue compared to RP. Similarly, public
transportation companies prefer RP because revenue generated by RP is used to
improve an affected area’s public transit system.
(2) Residents: People living in cordoned areas oppose PP because they need to pay
additional fees for parking. Even though they can use on-street parking spaces reserved
for residents, especially after business hours, they must pay additional fees for parking
every time they make a trip outside their residential area: even residents in the zone are
not exempt from PP. Therefore, residents of cordoned areas prefer RP because they are
exempt while still benefiting from reduced congestion.
(3) Business: A scheme’s impact on business varies with the type of business and
sometimes even the industry segment. For example, the London Chamber of Commerce
reported in its retail survey published in 2005 that the RP scheme in London was
negatively affecting retail business.36 According to the report, 79% of Central London
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retailers had experienced a fall in receipts and over half (56%) had seen a drop in
number of customers. Forty-two percent of respondents indicated they felt the scheme
was all or mostly to blame. London First, however, whose members account for 17% of
all employees in London and contribute 22% to the city’s gross domestic product, has
viewed the scheme positively.37 According to London First’s survey in London in 2003,
68% believed the scheme was working.
(4) Shops: Retail shops often benefit from congested roads and fully occupied parking lots,
so their owners might not view favorably the elimination of street parking nearby.
Last, we consider equity issues. All economic measures are discriminatory policy because
they try to exclude less productive people from using limited resources in order to
maximize the “social surplus”. The major distributional equity issues follow:
(1) Poor and Rich: Unavoidably, RP (and, to a lesser extent, PP) deprive the poor of
opportunities to drive cars, in order to increase the efficiency of utilization of limited
road resources. However, this equity problem can be alleviated significantly by
improving any public transportation systems currently provided. Revenue from RP (and
PP) can be used not only to improve public transportation but also to install new
affordable public transportation services.
(2) Suburbanites commuting to a cordoned area and urban commuters living inside it: Most
current RP (specifically, cordoned area pricing) effectively distributes suburban
commuters’ money to urban commuters when the latter are exempt from paying CC,
and the inequities increase as a cordoned area expands. Urban commuters therefore
benefit from uncrowded roads after RP implementation without an appropriate CC
burden. This inequity is difficult to resolve by means of RP alone because urban
commuters have the power to reject a CP scheme if they are not exempted from paying
a CC. However, this equity issue can be corrected by using PP to collect CC rather than
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by using RP.
3.4 Key Factors for Successful Implementation
Both successful and unsuccessful implementations of RP/PP indicate the importance of
quality public transportation systems as well as parking policies.
3.4.1 Enhancement of Public Transportation (PT)
Building up a quality PT system before RP/PP implementation is important because RP/PP
shifts drivers to PT commutation. If the current PT is poor, people are likely to disapprove
RP/PP. The quality of a public transport system includes its vehicles’ speed, punctuality,
accessibility, network coverage, cleanliness and safety. For example, before implementing
RP, London introduced about 300 additional buses,38 set new bus routes, increased the
frequencies of bus operation. London also has enforced traffic rules strictly with police
cooperation. London currently has 130 km of priority bus lanes, and bus service 24 h/day.
Tokyo, too, is famous for its high-quality PT system. To compensate for its less than
punctual bus system, a GPS bus-locator system has become common in Japan so users can
check buses’ current location by Internet or cell phone.39 Trains in Japan are reliable and
their network is extensive. Hence, Japanese commuters can often correctly estimate within
minutes the time they will reach a destination—even if their itinerary includes ten
transfers.40 In contrast, Edinburgh’s citizens were generally dissatisfied with their city’s PT,
and as a result, roundly rejected the prospect of RP when that was raised. One important
difference between London/Tokyo and U.S. cities should be noted: U.S. cities are less
densely populated; therefore, providing extensive PT in the U.S. is more costly. A park-and-
ride system can therefore be especially important in the U.S.
3.4.2 Parking Design Improvement
(1) Increase on-street parking prices
Inexpensive street parking creates congestion or adds to it not only by attracting more
people to use cars but also by adding traffic to congested roads as cars queue up in
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search of available street parking spaces—often so average wage earners can save
money. Queueing theory suggests that just a few percentage points’ increase in traffic
on almost fully congested roads significantly delays traffic. Real-world estimates are
that between 8% and 74% of traffic may be cruising in search of available street parking
in major US cities, with an average time required to find a vacant spot ranging from 3.5
to 14 minutes.41 These numbers can block nearly congested roads.
To make matters worse, one can also observe counteracting measures such as the
following parking policy regarding New York City’s often packed Theater District in
Manhattan; this particular ad can be spotted on a prominent banner near the top of the
New York City Department of Transportation website:42
Driving to the Theater District?
Use On-Street Parking – Only $2.00 per hour
Evenings & Saturdays at Muni-Meters throughout the Theater District
Thus, on-street parking spaces are only $2 per hour on weekdays 6 p.m.–12 a.m. and on
Saturdays 8 a.m.–12 p.m., and free on Sundays. When one of this paper’s authors
visited the area recently, on-street parking spaces were full even before traffic had
become congested; some cars were double-parked in front of off-street parking lots as
their drivers waited for a space to open up close by. People able to find on-street
parking were either extremely lucky or patient enough (and possessing sufficient spare
minutes) to spend a long time cruising or double-parking. The on-street parking
capacity was obviously insufficient; therefore, the extremely inexpensive parking
policy—“Only $2 per hour”—exacerbates congestion in the Theater District every
evening and also on Saturdays—not to mention Sundays, when parking is free. When
congestion is expected, street parking should be eliminated or its price level increased
to that of nearby off-street parking.
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(2) Eliminate parking subsidies
Subsidizing employees’ commuting expenses with free or discounted parking in lots is
popular with employers but counteracts PP’s effectiveness. Census data for the year
2000 show that more than half (53%) of total commuters (about 230,000 people)
driving into congested Manhattan each workday come from New York’s five boroughs.
The data also show that 35% of government workers in Manhattan drive to work mainly
because they have free parking.43 This problem could be solved by employers giving
employees the cash equivalent of parking fees to spend on using an alternate mode of
transportation. In California, for example, a law was passed in 1992 (although it has not
been enforced) requiring all employers to make such cash-out options available to
employees (Downs, 2004).
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4. Queueing Model for Parking Pricing
In the following, we develop a model that depicts patrolling drivers seeking on-street
metered or free parking. The model is motivated by recent data from Park Slope, Brooklyn
and by extensive earlier analyses by Donald C. Shoup.
We assume that all parking spaces are occupied almost all of the time that would-be parkers
are seeking parking spaces. Drivers seeking parking spaces are assumed to be driving
around through the streets seeking the first available spot. As soon as one opens up,
meaning a parked car is driven away, the next patrolling car virtually immediately occupies
that spot. The platoon of patrolling cars is a moving queue serviced in random order. Not all
would-be parkers are served in this queue, as the arrival rate of would-be parkers exceeds
the departure rate of parked cars. So, we allow drivers in the patrolling queue to become
discouraged, leave the queue and presumably settle for more expensive off-street parking
(for instance, in a parking garage or in a parking lot).
For modeling purposes we assume an infinitely large homogeneous city with S parking
spaces per square mile. We assume that the statistics of parking space availability and
desirability are uniform over the city. We assume that the time any given parker occupies a
parking space is a random variable W with probability density function fW(x) and mean
E[W]=1/µ. Prospective or would-be parkers appear in a Poisson manner at rate λA/hour,
where A is defined to be the size of the area being considered (in sq. mi.). Prospective
parkers will patrol looking for the first available parking space. Any unsuccessful would-be
parker can become discouraged. We model this process by assuming that any would-be
parker will leave the queue of patrolling would-be parkers at an individual Poisson rate of
γ/hr.
There are two “large numbers” features in this system that allow us to model the queue as a
Markovian system. First, regardless of the details of the probability density function (pdf)
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fW(x), the aggregate process of parked cars leaving parking spaces is accurately modeled as
a Poisson process with rate ASµ/hr. This is because the departure process from any given
parking space is seen as a renewal process with inter-renewal pdf fW(x). As is well known,
the merger or pooling of a large number of (sufficiently well-behaved) renewal processes
converges to a Poisson process (Cox and Smith, 1954). We assume that the number of
parking spaces we are considering is sufficiently large so that this approximation is very
accurate. Second, the time until reneging of any would-be parker could be any well-
behaved random variable having mean 1/γ, not necessarily a negative exponential random
variable. But, if the moving queue of patrolling would-be parkers is sufficiently large, we
again have the pooling of many renewal processes --- each having the same probability
density function of time until “renewal” and each starting at a random time. Such pooling
will result in the aggregate process of N would-be parkers leaving the queue becoming a
Poisson process with rate Nγ, where N is typically large enough so that the Poisson
assumption is valid.
We require one additional assumption in order to model this process efficiently. We assume
that when there are zero cars patrolling in the modeled area, no parked cars leave their
spaces. We know that this assumption is incorrect, but we are focusing on large queues of
patrolling cars in which case the likelihood of zero patrolling cars is very small. If this
assumption in an application setting is not valid, one can eliminate it be creating a larger
Markovian model that includes the possibility of several or even many empty parking
spaces.
In our work we will focus on a square area of the city having unit area (i.e., one square mile
or one square kilometer). We will assume that this region is large enough for our saturation
congestion theory to be valid. One might argue that in any actual city no would-be parker
feels constrained to patrol within any arbitrary boundaries. This is true. But for every
would-be parker who starts within our modeled square and then ventures out of it looking
for an available parking space, there is statistically an another equivalent would-be parker
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who started in some near-by zone who ventures into our zone. Statistically, for everyone
who leaves, there is someone who enters. We can take care of this by placing “reflecting
barriers” around our zone, so that when anyone in the real system leaves, we simply reflect
him or her back into the zone, creating a statistical equivalence to the real non-cordoned
system.
We now can draw the state-rate-transition diagram for this queue, assuming one square mile
of operation, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1.  State-Rate-Transition Diagram for Queueing System
By the usual process of “telescoping” balance of flow equations, we can express each
steady state probability Pn in terms of P0 and a product of upward transition rates (λ’s)
divided by the product of downward transition rates between state n and state 0. The result
is
€ 
Pn =
λn
(Sµ + iγ)
i=1
n
∏
P0 (1)
Now, invoking the requirement that the steady state probabilities sum to one, we obtain
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n
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∑ =1,
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∏
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∞
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Hence,
€ 
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λn
(Sµ + iγ)
i=1
n
∏
(1+ λ
m
(Sµ + iγ)
i=1
m
∏
)
m=1
∞
∑
,   n =1,2,3,... (2)
For steady state to exist we require P0>0, which always occurs. But we want P0 to be very
small for our approximations to be valid.
From the solutions obtained above, we can find all of the quantities of Little’s Law, L, Lq,
W and Wq. The basic Little’s Law relationship is, of course, 
€ 
L = λW . Here since “the
system” is the queue only and service implies finding an empty parking space, we have the
equivalences, L = Lq  and W = Wq.  L is the time-average number of cars seeking parking
spaces, or equivalently, the mean size of the patrolling queue of would-be parkers. W is the
mean time that a patrolling car remains on patrol, until leaving either by finding a parking
space or by frustration and reneging from the queue.
There are other performance measures of interest. The mean number of parking spaces
becoming available per hour is 
€ 
(1− P0)Sµ ≈ Sµ since P0 <<1. The mean number of renegers
per hour is 
€ 
λ − (1− P0)Sµ ≈ λ − Sµ , assuming λ> Sµ (which is required for our
approximations to be valid). For a random patrolling would-be parker, the probability of
successfully getting a parking space is 
€ 
(1− P0)Sµ /λ ≈ Sµ /λ . This agrees with intuition. If
say 100 parking spaces become available per hour and 250 would-be parkers arrive each
hour, then 40% will succeed in finding a parking space and 60% will leave in frustration.
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In the following we will assume that 
€ 
0 < P0 ≈ 0. This means that the queue of patrolling
cars is, for all practical purposes, never empty. Under these conditions, we argue that the
mean number of patrolling cars is
€ 
L = Lq =
λ − Sµ
γ
(3)
This is a fundamental result for our saturated on-street parking system. We argue its validity
by changing the queue discipline from SIRO (Service In Random Order) to LCFS (Last
Come, First Served). It is well known that L and Lq are invariant under the set of queue
disciplines whose preferential orderings do not include customer-specific service times. The
LCFS discipline is one such discipline. By LCFS here we mean the following: The next
available parking space would be given instantaneously to that patrolling car that has been
patrolling for the least amount of time. Usually this car would be the last to have arrived in
queue. But it might be the case that the most recent car has already left the queue by
reneging, in which case the next “youngest” patrolling car would be selected. The rate of
successful parkings per hour is 
€ 
Sµ , and thus the fraction of would-be parkers who receive
parking spaces virtually instantaneously upon arrival is 
€ 
Sµ /λ . The cars that do not get
nearly instantaneous parking stay patrolling for an amount of time that is exponentially
distributed with mean 
€ 
1/γ . For this revised queueing system Wq, the mean time patrolling
can be written,
€ 
Wq ≈ (0)(Sµ /λ) + (1/γ)(1− Sµ /λ) =
λ − Sµ
λγ
Since 
€ 
Lq = λWq , we can write
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€ 
Lq ≈
λ − Sµ
γ
,
as was to be shown.
In the above argument we use “approximately equal to” signs instead of “equals signs.”
This is due to the fact that there is a small but positive delay between a car’s arrival in the
queue of patrolling cars and its selection as a recipient of a parking space. The mean delay
between the arrival of a newly patrolling car and the emergence of a newly available
parking space is 
€ 
1/Sµ, assumed to be very small in contrast to 1/γ.
In the following two subsections we model explicitly two alternative ways of implementing
the LCFS queue discipline, as discussed above. These analyses are to show the operational
feasibility of the revised but highly fictional LCFS queue discipline. The “real system” at
all times is still assumed to follow the SIRO queue discipline.
4.1 Random Walk
Assuming the postulated LCFS queue discipline, one can model the arrival of a newly
patrolling car as an entry into “state 1” an infinite random walk on the non-negative
integers, where state 0 implies that the car transitions to a trap state -- signifying successful
assignment to a parking space. Transitioning to any higher state j+1,
€ 
j ≥1, indicates that the
position in queue has been changed upward from j to j+1. Due to the LCFS discipline,
higher states imply less likelihood of eventually receiving a parking space. If we define
€ 
β0 ≡P{car enters the trap state}=
 P{car transitions down one state in the random walk} =
 P{car obtains a parking space},
then we can write
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€ 
β0 = P{first transition is to trap state}+ (1− P{first transition is to trap state})β02
The reason for the term 
€ 
β0
2  is the fact that if the car has transitioned into state 2, then to be
awarded a parking space it must first transition down to state 1 and then eventually to state
0. Each transition down one state occurs with probability 
€ 
β0 , and the transition processes in
each case are independent. The probability that the first transition is to the trap state is equal
to the probability that a parking spot becomes available before the next arrival, and that is
equal to 
€ 
Sµ /(Sµ + λ) . Thus we can write,
€ 
β0 =
Sµ
Sµ + λ +
λ
Sµ + λ β0
2
The solution to this quadratic equation is 
€ 
β0 = Sµ /λ , and that agrees with our intuition and
previous results.
There is a subtlety in the derivation, as the argument appears to ignore reneging. Since
reneging can occur, the “cars” in the argument are in fact ordered slots: youngest slot in
queue, 2nd youngest slot in queue, etc. The car occupant of any slot may change due to
reneging. Once that is seen, the results are seen to be valid, even in the presence of
reneging.
4.2 Queueing Newly Available Parking Spaces
If one does not wish to consider the LCFS policy analyzed above, perhaps due to unrealistic
demands on tracking newly arriving cars, one can accomplish the same objective by using a
queue discipline that we will call NCNS, Next Come, Next Served. In this scheme each
newly available parking slot enters a queue of other newly available parking slots, and this
queue is depleted by newly arriving cars seeking parking slots. Any driver in a car lucky
enough to arrive when this queue of available parking slots is nonempty is immediately
29
given a slot. All others are denied slots forever, and they join the other patrollers who
eventually renege after patrolling a random time having mean 1/γ. This process can be
modeled as an M/M/1 queue, with state i indicating i available parking slots (i = 0,1,2,…),
and with upward transition rates Sµ and downward transition rates λ. Since λ> Sµ, we
know that the queue is stable and possesses a steady state solution. Using well-known
results from the M/M/1 queue, we immediately have,
P{an empty parking space is available at a random time}=
€ 
1− P0 = Sµ /λ <1.
Since Poisson Arrival See Time Averages (PASTA), we have
 P{a random arrival obtains a parking space}=
€ 
1− P0 = Sµ /λ <1,
as expected.
In steady state, the mean number of free parking spaces is,
€ 
Np = nPn
n=1
∞
∑ = P0 n(Sµ /λ)n
n=1
∞
∑ = λ − Sµ
λ
n(Sµ /λ)n
n=1
∞
∑ = Sµ
λ − Sµ .
For example, if λ = 2Sµ, then Np = 1 free parking space. One free parking space would
remain free for an amount of time equal to the time of the next driver seeking a parking
space, having mean 1/λ. Usually this time is quite small in contrast other times in the
system. More generally, in this instance Little’s Law states that 
€ 
Np = SµWp , so we have the
mean time that a newly available parking space remains available is
€ 
Wp =
1
λ − Sµ .
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As an example, if λ = 100 cars per hour and Sµ = 40 cars per hour, then Wp = (1/60) hour =
1 minute. Again, this time is small in contrast to other times in the system, and all of our
results are correct within acceptable “engineering approximations.”
In conclusion, we can feasibly implement a car-to-parking-space queue discipline that
supports Eq.(3), using either LCFS or NCNS. But we remember that the actual or “real”
discipline is still assumed to be SIRO.
4.3 The Distribution of Patrolling Cars
Using the above logic, we see that the entire system, conceptually augmented with either
LCFS or NCNS queue discipline; can be viewed as a Poisson arrival queue with infinite
number of servers, i.e., an 
€ 
M/G/∞  queue. “Service” occurs for any car the instant the car
obtains a parking space or reneges from patrolling. The distribution of numbers of
patrolling cars in the system is not affected by our augmented queueing discipline. Mean
service time M can be written,
€ 
M = (0) Sµ
λ
+ (λ − Sµ
λ
) 1
γ
=
λ − Sµ
λγ
.
The Poisson process arrival rate is λ. For the 
€ 
M/G/∞  queue having arrival rate λ and mean
service time M, the steady state probability distribution of the number N of customers in the
system is well-known to be Poisson with mean λ M, i.e.,
€ 
P{N = n) = (λM)
n
n! e
−λM ,   n = 0,1,2,...
In this case, we can write the probability that there are N cars patrolling for parking spaces
is equal to
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€ 
P{N = n) =
(λ − Sµ
γ
)n
n! e
−
λ−Sµ
γ ,   n = 0,1,2,...
Here again we see that the mean number of patrolling cars is equal to 
€ 
λ − Sµ
γ
, the result of
Eq. (3). But now we know that the entire distribution – assuming our saturation conditions
– is Poisson. Finally, as saturation grows worse, that is as λ increases towards ever-greater
congestion, the Poisson distribution becomes a Gaussian or Normal distribution.
The next step to take with this model is to place hourly prices on on-street parking and off-
street parking. Then one makes certain model parameters dependent on these prices,
especially the price difference between on-street and off-street parking. These ideas build
on the suggestions of Shoup (2005). As the price difference between on-street and off-street
parking becomes less, one should have the rate γ at which one leaves the queue of
patrolling cars increase. That is, the desire to find an on-street parking space and the
patience it requires in the patrolling queue will decrease as the price advantage of on-street
parking decreases. Eventually as one gets closer to price parity, our approximate
assumption of an endless queue of patrolling cars becomes invalid and we must modify the
model accordingly. Shoup’s stated objective is to raise on-street prices so that one has
roughly 15% of the on-street parking spaces available in steady state. For the model, this
would require extending the state-rate-transition diagram down significantly into
unsaturated states but still allowing the artifice of stopping at some left-most nonzero state
that has very small steady state probability. We do not see the need to model the system all
the way down to zero parking spaces being occupied.
4.4 Congestion Pricing and Queueing Theory44
Congestion pricing theory is based on the following observation: The congestion cost
caused by the entrance of a driver to a queueing system consists of the cost of delay to this
driver (internal cost) plus the cost of additional delay to all other users caused by this driver
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(external cost). For example, if the driver enters into a congested road and experiences 5
minutes delay, the internal cost to him is the cost of 5 minutes. However, when the road is
very congested, the entrance of this driver may delay 1 minute to 7 other drivers. Then the
external cost generated by him is the cost of 7 minutes to the other drivers. In order to
achieve the most efficient use of the road facility, this external cost should be burdened by
each driver. In economic terms, the external cost should be internalized. This was first
pointed out by Vickrey45 and by Carlin and Park:46 They claimed that “Optimal use of a
transportation facility cannot be achieved unless each additional (marginal) user pays for
all the additional costs that this user imposes on all other users and on the facility itself. A
congestion toll not only contributes to maximizing social economic welfare, but is also
necessary to reach such a result.” In 1959, William Vickrey, Columbia University
economist and 1996 Nobel Laureate, proposed an electronic RP system in detail to the Joint
Committee on Washington Metropolitan Problems.47 At the time, he also pointed out the
importance of a variable pricing system for on-street parking spaces in order to ensure some
vacancy to accommodate the demand and avoid unnecessary traffic congestion caused by
on-street parking shortages.
We follow economic principles to obtain the “optimal” congestion pricing. Consider a
queueing facility with a single type of user in steady state and let
=λ demand rate per unit of time by road users.
c = cost of delay per unit time per user.
C= total cost of delay per unit time incurred by all users in the system.
Lq = expected number of users in queue.
Wq = expected delay time in queue for a random user.
We can also assume that L=Lq and W=Wq, as in our parking model.
Then the time-average total delay cost per unit time can be written,
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qq WccLC λ== ,
where Little’s Law is used. The marginal delay cost (MC) imposed by an additional road
user can be obtained as,
€ 
MC = dCdλ = cWq + cλ
dWq
dλ .
The first term on the right is the internal cost experienced by the additional road user, and
the second is the external cost due to the increase in the expected delay, 
€ 
dWq
dλ , resulting
from the increased traffic created by this user. Hence, we can write two components of the
marginal delay cost MC as follows:
(1) Marginal internal cost: 
€ 
MCi = cWq
(2) Marginal external cost: 
€ 
MCe = cλ
dWq
dλ .
Vickrey suggested that the marginal external cost MCe should be imposed on each road user
in order to realize socially “optimal” utilization of road resources. In the most common
cordoned-area RP scheme today, however, the fee for residents in cordoned areas is
significantly discounted; also, the CC level is set to a constant fee per day regardless of the
frequency of trips a driver makes. Therefore, imposing appropriate charges on each road
user is difficult for RP, and consequently road resources become overused, which is partly
the reason why implementing RP over a large area is difficult. PP, on the other hand, does
not present such issues because a parking fee is charged all road users impartially (except
for privileges granted to physically challenged people), per trip, regardless of whether or
not they are residents of the charging area.
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4.5 The Parking Pricing Model
From our previous work, for the parking process in saturation, the total delay cost per unit
time and associated marginal delay cost are
€ 
C = cLq ≈ λ − Sµ( )
c
γ
 (4)
and
γλ
cCMC ≈
∂
∂
= . (5)
We can also obtain the marginal internal cost and marginal external cost,
€ 
MCi = cWq ≈ 1−
Sµ
λ
 
 
 
 
 
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 
 
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(6)
€ 
MCe = cλ
∂Wq
∂λ
≈
Sµ
λ
⋅
c
γ
. (7)
The ratio of MCe/MCi is
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(8)
Here, we observe an interesting result. For a given c, the marginal delay cost to society is
dependent only on γ and does not depend on Sµ or λ. In a sense, in saturation each
additional would-be parker “brings with him” an average of 1/γ of delay, to be incurred by
somebody or some combination of people. However, the marginal internal cost, the
marginal external cost and their ratio r are dependent only on 
λ
µS , which is the success
probability for would-be parkers to find on-street parking spaces. Eq. (7) shows that the
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marginal external cost MCe is proportional to the parking success probability. MCe becomes
larger when more would-be parkers expect they will find parking spaces. MCe decreases if
we reduce the number of on-street parking spaces S, or increase the arrival rate λ, or
increase the reneging rate γ. If half of would-be parkers will find a parking space, then
marginal internal and external costs are equal. If 90% of all would-be parkers are denied
parking, then the external cost MCe associated with one new would-be parker is only 0.1c/γ,
whereas the internal cost MCi is 0.9c/γ. This is due to the fact that 90% of the time our new
would-be parker arrives, he will be denied parking and will have to incur the mean
patrolling time (cost) 1/γ  almost all by himself; he denies others only 10% of the time.
4.6 Trading Off Cost Savings and Convenience
Economists like to speak of “optimal” charges for those imposing external costs, this
problem being no exception. But it is difficult to operationalize this concept. What precisely
is meant by optimal? Optimal is an absolute word requiring a precise and unambiguous
objective function and set of constraints. We do not have those conditions in the context of
on-street vs. off-street parking. And how do the fees collected get distributed to aggrieved
parties? As operations researchers and not as economists, we tend to think of drivers as
decision makers who weigh their options and act accordingly.
Without significant empirical research, it is not possible to know precisely how would-be
parkers would behave in our “patrolling queue” situation. But we can make some plausible
first-order assumptions, presented in a transparent manner for review and critique. First, it
seems clear that some drivers would value their time more than others, and those would
tend to leave the queue of patrolling drivers more quickly than others. Second, a driver’s
willingness to spend time in the patrolling queue would rise or fall with the price
differential between on-street and off-street parking, with higher price differentials meaning
more willingness to spend time looking for less expensive on-street parking. Third, any
unsuccessful patrolling driver will eventually become discouraged, “cut his losses,” and
leave the queue for more expensive off-street parking.
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We can develop a simple model reflecting these assumptions. Suppose there are D
categories of drivers, where category d, 
€ 
1≤ d ≤ D, has a self-assessed value for time of Wd
dollars per hour. We assume the categories are rank-ordered such that
€ 
W1 ≥W2 ≥W3 ≥ ...≥WD . Let pd be the fraction of all would-be parkers belonging to
category d, 
€ 
1≤ d ≤ D. Clearly, 
€ 
pd
d=1
D
∑ =1. Let 
€ 
Δ  be the hourly parking price differential (in
dollars) between off-street and on-street parking, with the on-street parking being less
expensive. We now need a decision criterion for a patrolling driver to leave the queue and
accept the more expensive off-street parking. One plausible criterion is this: When the value
of the time already invested in patrolling for a less expensive on-street parking space equals
the price differential between off-street and on-street parking, then the expected values of
the respective options – when including sunk costs – become equal. But the variance of
costs for continued patrolling is large, whereas the variance of cost associated with the off-
street option is zero (a known, published parking fee). Thus, the decision rule is to leave the
queue and switch to off-street parking when the sunk cost of time invested becomes equal
to the parking price differential. This set of assumptions provides a basis for evaluating the
resultant reneging parameter γ as a function of the price differential 
€ 
Δ . The mean time that
a category d patrolling driver would remain patrolling is 
€ 
1
γ d
=
Δ
Wd
.
Including all D categories, weighed by their respective relative frequencies, the resulting
relationship can be written,
€ 
1
γ
= Δ
pd
Wdd=1
D
∑ . (9)
As a numerical example, consider one-hour parking with D = 3; pd = 1/3 for d = 1, 2, 3;
€ 
W1 =100, W2 = 25, W3 =10. Then
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€ 
1
γ
=
Δ
3 (
1
100 +
1
25 +
1
10) =
Δ
3 (0.01+ 0.04 + 0.10) = 0.05Δ .
If 
€ 
Δ  = US$10/hr. then (1/γ)= 0.5 hr. = 30 minutes. If 
€ 
Δ  = US$20/hr., then (1/γ) is doubled
to 60 minutes. One socially positive aspect of the driver behavior assumed in this model is
that the successful on-street parkers are differentially more likely to be poorer people who
value their time less than others. Those who value their time highly will tend to leave the
queue more quickly and pay the higher off-street parking rates.
4.7 Extending the Model to Include Heterogeneous Drivers
In this section, we confirm the intuition that “poorer people are more likely to be successful
on-street parkers than richer people”. Assume there are two types of drivers, or “would-be-
parkers,” Type 1 and Type 2, whose corresponding arrival rates and reneging rates are λi
and γi  (i=1, 2), respectively. We construct a 2-dimensional state-rate-transition diagram for
the Markovian queue created by two types of drivers. Assume that each state is represented
by the ordered pair n1 and n2, which correspond to the respective numbers of Type 1 and
Type 2 drivers in the system. The state-rate-transition diagram is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2.  State-Rate-Transition Diagram for
Queueing System with Two Types of Drivers
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As before, we continue to assume that 0<
€ 
P00 ≈ 0, but now for this 2-dimensional system.
Again as before, we assume that the road is congested, with either type of driver able to fill
all available parking spaces: µλ S≥1  and µλ S≥2 .
We can write a set of balance-of-flow equations, where the balanced flows occur across
complete horizontal cuts of the network of Figure 2,
€ 
(λ1 + λ2)P00 = (Sµ + γ1)P10 + (Sµ + γ 2)P01 = Sµ(P10 + P01) + γ1 P10 + 0P01( ) + γ 2(P01 + 0P10)
€ 
(λ1 + λ2)(P10 + P01) = (Sµ + 2γ1)P20 + (
1
2 Sµ + γ1)P11 + (
1
2 Sµ + γ 2)P11 + (Sµ + 2γ 2)P02
= Sµ(P20 + P11 + P02) + γ1 2P20 + P11 + 0P02( ) + γ 2 2P02 + P11 + 0P20( )
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€ 
(λ1 + λ2)(P20 + P11 + P02) = (Sµ + 3γ1)P30 + (
2
3 Sµ + 2γ1)P21 + (
1
3 Sµ + γ1)P12
+(13 Sµ + γ 2)P21 + (
2
3 Sµ + 2γ 2)P12 + (Sµ + 3γ 2)P03
= Sµ(P30 + P21 + P12 + P03) + γ1 3P30 + 2P21 + P12 + 0P03( ) + γ 2 3P03 + 2P12 + P21 + 0P30( )
…
€ 
(λ1 + λ2)(P(n−1)0 + P(n−2)1 + ...+ P0(n−1)) = Sµ(Pn0 + P(n−1)1 + ...+ P0n )
+γ1 nPn0 + (n −1)P(n−1)1 + ...+1P1(n−1) + 0P0n( ) + γ 2 nP0n + (n −1)P1(n−1) + ...+1P(n−1)1 + 0Pn0( )
…
Adding up the countably infinite set of balance equations, we obtain
€ 
(λ1 + λ2)( Pnm
n,m= 0
∞
∑ ) = Sµ( Pnm
n,m= 0
∞
∑ − P00) + γ1 nPnm
n,m= 0
∞
∑
 
 
 
 
 
 + γ 2 mPnm
n,m= 0
∞
∑
 
 
 
 
 
 .
Using the assumption 
€ 
P00 ≈ 0, invoking the normalizing condition
€ 
Pnm
n,m= 0
∞
∑ =1, and using the
definitions 
€ 
L1 = nPnm
n,m= 0
∞
∑  and 
€ 
L2 = mPnm
n,m= 0
∞
∑ , we obtain
€ 
λ1 + λ2 = Sµ + γ1L1 + γ 2L2 .                     (10)
We need to derive one more equation to solve for L1 and L2. In order to do this, consider the
mean number of Type 1 and Type 2 renegers per hour, which are
€ 
nγ1Pnm
n,m= 0
∞
∑ = γ1 nPnm
n,m= 0
∞
∑
 
 
 
 
 
 = γ1L1 and 
€ 
γ 2L2 , respectively. Using these, the steady state mean
number of parking spaces available and taken by Type 1 and Type 2 parkers per hour are
€ 
λ1 − γ1L1 and 
€ 
λ2 − γ 2L2 , respectively. Note that the sum of the mean number of parking
spaces available and taken by Type 1 and Type 2 parkers per hour is
€ 
λ1 − γ1L1( ) + λ2 − γ 2L2( ) = Sµ , using Eq. (10). Note also that both 
€ 
λ1 − γ1L1 and 
€ 
λ2 − γ 2L2  are
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positive because the mean number of renegers 
€ 
γ1L1 and 
€ 
γ 2L2must be less than the arrival
rate λ1 and λ2, respectively, in steady state.
We now argue that the proportion of parking spaces taken hourly by Type 1 (Type 2) drivers
is equal to the proportion of cruising drivers who are Type 1 (Type 2). For if not, then Type
1 (Type 2) drivers would be more or less skilled than Type 2 (Type 1) drivers at finding
parking spaces. Due to the SIRO queue discipline that rewards that driver, Type 1 or Type
2, who just happens to be closest to the newly available parking space, each type of driver
is by definition equally skilled. And clearly the proportion of parking spaces taken per hour
by Type 1 (Type 2) drivers is equal to the fraction of parking spaces occupied by Type 1
(Type 2) drivers. For if not, then the parking time statistics of the two types of drivers
would differ, and this is not allowed in our model.
Invoking these results, we can write
    
€ 
L2
L1
=
λ2 − γ 2L2
λ1 − γ1L1
,   or, simplifying,   
€ 
γ 2 − γ1 =
λ2
L2
−
λ1
L1
         (11)
Combining Eqs. (10) and (11), we have
€ 
γ 2 − γ1 =
λ2
L2
−
λ1
λ1 + λ2 − Sµ
γ1
−
γ 2
γ1
L2
                 (12)
and
1
1
1
2
1
2
21
2
12 LLS
λ
γ
γ
γ
µλλ
λ
γγ −
−
−+
=−                  (13)
Since both 
€ 
λ1 − γ1L1 and 
€ 
λ2 − γ 2L2  are positive, the denominators in Eqs. (12) and (13) are
all positive. Therefore, unique positive solutions for both L1 and L2 are guaranteed in the
above equations. Analytical solutions can be obtained for both L1 and L2 using the quadratic
41
formula. The method extends to three or any number of different types of drivers.
For simple illustrative purposes, consider a numerical example. Assume there are two types
of drivers: 100 poor people per hour arrive to the system and their per-person reneging rate
is 1/hr., and 300 rich people per hour arrive to the same system and their per-person
reneging rate is 3/hr. Both types of drivers are trying to find on-street parking spaces which
capacity is 50=µS /hr. In this case, one could argue that poor people value their time at a
rate of 1/3 that of rich people. By placing numbers in Eqs. (12) and (13), we obtain
2
2
1
3
1
50300100
10030013
LL −−+
−=−  and 
1
1
100
3
1
3
50300100
30013
LL
−
−
−+
=−
Solving, we have 
€ 
L1 = 77  and 
€ 
L2 = 91. Hence, the ratio of poor and rich in parking spaces
are
€ 
Poor :Rich = L1 : L2 = 77 : 91= 46% :54% .
The interpretation is as follows: Even though poor people’s arrival is 25% of the total
arrivals, poor people occupy nearly half of the on-street parking spaces because of their
lower reneging rate, their greater “patience” while cruising for an available parking space.
Furthermore, the success rate of finding available parking spaces for poor and rich are
€ 
λ1 − γ1L1
λ1
=
100 −1⋅ 77
100 = 23%  and 
€ 
λ2 − γ 2L2
λ2
=
300 − 3 ⋅ 91
300 = 9%, respectively. Therefore, in
terms of distributional equity, the provision of on-street parking spaces can be seen as
“good” because poor people tend to utilize inexpensive parking more often than rich
people. However, the result also suggests that poor people are more apt to patrol than rich
people, thereby maintaining levels of street congestion that may be found unacceptable.
The way to fix that problem is to raise the price of on-street parking, and that would
increase the reneging rate of poor people since the price advantage of patrolling for on-
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street parking diminishes.
5. Conclusion
We reviewed current various road pricing (RP) and parking pricing (PP) schemes for
implementing congestion pricing (CP). We found PP is not only a cost effective alternative
to RP which can be implemented in a small city but also has a capability of controlling
local and time-varying traffic congestion using the price differentials between on-street
parking and off-street parking. Following the review, we developed a new queueing model
of the parking problem. We found (1) the queueing delay is inversely proportional to
reneging rate and the distribution of number of patrolling drivers follows Poisson
distribution, (2) the marginal delay cost imposed by an additional road user becomes
constant as a result of reneging when on-street parking spaces are full, and (3) the
congestion charge (CC) is calculated as the marginal external cost. We then extend the
homogeneous model to heterogeneous model with two types of drivers. We found that the
successful on-street parkers are differentially more likely to be poorer people who value
their time less than others.
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